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Abstract
Since the financial crisis broke out in East Asia, the importance of financial development and stability
had been noted. This paper tries to examine the relationship between financial development and the source
of growth for three Asian economies, namely, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. Particularly, we wish to emphasize
the role of financial development and structure (including banking and stock markets), monetary and
financial policies, as well as the degree of international capital mobility in the economic growth processes.
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) and principal component analysis, we find that (1) high
investment had accelerated economic growth in Japan, while high investment to GDP ratio did not
necessarily lead to better growth performance if investment did not have been allocated efficiently, e.g. in
Taiwan and Korea cases; (2) real export growth rate had contributed to Taiwan and Korea; (3) the finance-
aggregate had positive effects on Taiwan’s economy, but had negative effect on other countries; (4) the stock
market development had positive effects on Taiwan’s economic growth; (5) Taiwanese economy suffered
less from the Asian financial crisis; (6) after foreign exchange deregulation, capital outflows had negative
effects on all three economies, while the effect of capital inflows is negative but insignificant.
# 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C33; E44; F2; F43; G32
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1. Introduction
The rapid economic growth of the Asian countries has been a focus of interest for academics
and policy makers for the last three decades. Among them, once Taiwan and Korea were colonies
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of Japan, and these three nations exhibited similarities in economic structure and policies. For
example, all three economies had followed export oriented development strategy and had
accumulated significant foreign reserves from trade surplus and experienced higher rates of
domestic investment over the past 30 years. These three nations are also active members in the
WTO.2 In addition, financial liberalization and financial reform have been undergone in these
nations recently. This offers a superb sample to be examined the role of the financial sector
development in economic growth processes. That is, it is interesting to investigate the
relationship between financial development and the source of growth in Taiwan, Korea, and
Japan.
The general idea that economic growth is related to financial development and structure can
go back at least to Schumpeter (1911). Schumpeter emphasized the importance of the banking
system in economic growth and highlighted circumstances when financial institutions can
actively spur innovation and future growth by identifying and funding productive investments.
Earlier literature including Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) had suggested
that financial system should have played an important role in economic growth. These models,
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) showed that financial development would raise saving,
capital accumulation, and hence economic growth. Recent theoretical papers by Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine (1991), Saint-Paul (1992), King and
Levine (1993a), and Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) have developed various theoretical
frameworks that link financial activities or services with steady state growth. However, among
them, except Saint-Paul (1992), models also show that financial development can hurt growth.
Specifically, financial development by enhancing resource allocation and hence the returns to
saving may lower saving rates.
At the empirical studies, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) used cross-countries data to analyze
the relationship between economic growth and the financial development. Their results had
shown that a range of financial indicators are robustly positively correlated with economic
growth. But, they also found that government intervention in the financial system has a negative
effect on the growth rate. Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine (1996b) used 44 cross-countries data from
1986 through 1993 had found that a positive relationship between stock market and financial
institutions development. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) employed time series data for each of
16 countries showed that finance is a leading sector in the process of economic development.
Also, Odedokun (1996) employed time series data for 71 developing countries and showed that
financial intermediation had promoted economic growth, in some 85% of the countries. While
the empirical works above focus on only banking sector development, they ignored the effect of
stock market development.
Levine and Zervos (1998) investigated whether measures of stock market liquidity, size,
volatility, and integration with world capital markets are correlated with economic growth. Their
study provided empirical evidence on the theoretical debates regarding the linkages between
stock markets and long-run economic growth. However, their study did not utilize time series
model to test the growth relation in a particular country. Instead, they used 47 countries data from
1976 though 1993 by taking the standard cross-country growth regression framework like Barro
(1991) to test the economic growth hypothesis. Also, Leahy, Schich, Wehinger, and Pelgrin
(2001) used OECD countries data and showed that stock market and financial institutions
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development are correlated with economic growth. Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000) used both cross-country data and dynamic panel data techniques to
assess the role of the financial development in stimulating economic growth. Their results found
that financial development had been robustly linked with economic growth and total factor
productivity growth.
Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel (2001) used quarterly data and applied time series model
to five developed economies and showed that while both banking sector and stock market
development could explain subsequent growth, the effect of banking sector development had
been substantially larger than that of stock market development. Hsu and Lin (2000) had
investigated the relationship between long-run economic growth and financial development to
see whether stock market and financial institutions promote economic growth using Taiwan’s
data from 1964 through 1996. The empirical method utilized is the vector autoregressive
error-correction model proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1992). They found that both
banking and stock market development are positively related with short-run and long-term
economic growth. In particular, the financial depth measured by the ratio of the broad
monetary aggregate (M2) and GDP had strong effect on the output growth. In addition, they
also found that Granger causality exists between financial development measures and
economic development in both directions occurred during the study period (i.e. from 1964
through 1996).
However, most of the empirical studies on economic growth had neglected the effect of
international capital mobility on economic growth. High degree of capital mobility not only
affects independence of domestic monetary and fiscal policies, but also adds to complexity of
managing saving and investment problems in a country.
Hanson (1994) suggested that a stable macroeconomy and domestic financial liberalization to
a significant degree are preconditions to international financial liberalization. Johnston, Darbar,
and Echeverria (1997) examined issues in sequencing and pacing capital account liberalization
and draws lessons from experience in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Their results
suggested that capital account liberalization should be approached as an integrated part of
comprehensive reform strategies and should be paced with the implementation of appropriate
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies. However, Kim and Suh (1998) suggested that capital
account liberalization will enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of financial transactions
for Korean corporations. Hence, it cannot further delay the opening of domestic capital market to
foreigners as well as the foreign capital markets to domestic residents.
In this paper we will focus on those factors such as financial development and structure
(including banking and stock markets), monetary and financial policies, as well as the degree of
international capital mobility in the economic growth processes of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. In
contrast to the recent empirical literature, this study uses a longer period quarterly data (1981:1–
2001:3) and utilizes the generalized method of moments (GMM) and principal component
analysis to estimate. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the experiences
with financial liberalization in these countries. Section 3 describes an econometric model and
the data used in this study. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 is the concluding
remarks.
2. Selected country experiences with financial liberalization
This section discusses the three countries’ experience of financial liberalization during the last
two decades. World Bank (1993) showed that Taiwan, Korea, and Japan have achieved high
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economic growth since the post-World War II is due to the guide of government policies.
However, the government policies of financial liberalization process implemented by these
countries were different during the last two decades. In order to explore cross-sectional
differences in financial liberalization processes, we will focus on four key elements: (1) interest
rate deregulation, (2) deregulation of foreign exchange rate, (3) enlargement of the business
scope of financial institutions, and (4) liberalization of capital movement.3
2.1. Interest rate deregulation
The three economies’ interest rate deregulation proceeded slowly and gradually. Among them,
Taiwan had pushed on liberalization of interest rates fastest and Korean interest rate full
deregulation occurred latest. Before 1975, Taiwanese interest rate was determined by the central
bank. The amendment of the Banking Law promulgated in 1975, and Taiwanese government
started to relax its controls on bank lending rates. In 1976, the money market was established and
stressed the interest rates should be decided by market. Deregulation of the interest rate ceiling on
the money market was effective in November 1980, when the Guidelines Governing the
Adjustment of Interest Rates of Banks promulgated. And fromMarch 1985 banks were allowed to
price their own interest rates. In 1986, bankswere accordedmore freedom to decide interest rates of
bank deposits, and deregulation of interest ratewas finally completed in July 1989RevisedBanking
Law. Therefore, it took 14 years for the liberalization of Taiwanese interest rates to be complete.
In Korea, the partial interest rate deregulation on commercial paper (CP) started in June 1981.
The abolition of preferential interest rates in 1982 and extensive deregulation of interest rates of
banks and non-banking financial intermediaries in 1988 resulted in the liberalization of most of
the lending rates, interest rates in money and capital markets, and partial liberalization of the
interest rates on deposits (see Kim & Suh, 1998). However, as the prospect of becoming an
OECD member country was instrumental in the move towards liberalizing its financial market,
Korean government accelerated its interest rates liberalization and announced a plan to
implement a four phase interest rate deregulation from August 1991. The restrictions on interest
rates of bank loans and deposits were totally abolished in July 1997. Therefore, Korean interest
rates liberalization took about 16 years, longer than Taiwan and Japan.
In Japan, the liberalization of interest rates on large-denomination CDs (certificates of
deposit) began in May 1979. After several years of no further deregulation measures, the
Japanese government started to decontrol interest rates step by step from 1984, due to the
requests of the United States and consideration of the internationalization of the yen. The interest
rate deregulation proceeded slowly and full deregulation occurred much later than other major
industrialized economies. By 1993 almost all bank deposit rates except for small-denominated
and demand deposits had been liberalized. The deregulation of deposit interest rate was
completed in 1994. The liberalization of interest rates took 15 years.
2.2. Deregulation of foreign exchange rate
In foreign exchange deregulation the three cases were also differed significantly. The
Taiwanese foreign exchange systemwas converted from a fixed rate system to a managed flexible
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rate system and started operation in February 1979, when the foreign exchange market was
established.4 Due to the continuous and huge trade surplus during the 1980s, Taiwanese
government amended the Statute Governing the Foreign Exchange in 1986. And the foreign
exchange control was remarkably deregulated accordingly in July 1987.5 Although the exchange
rate of the NT dollar against the U.S. dollar has been allowed to fluctuate since then, it is
controlled occasionally by the central bank. Until now, the foreign exchange market is still only
partially liberalized. To guide financial system moving toward internationalization, the foreign
exchange control on the current account was totally abolished, and restrictions on the capital
movement had also relaxed significantly since 2004.
In Korea, a foreign currency call market was set up in December 1989, and a completely
revised Foreign Exchange Management Act was passed in December 1991. The exchange rate
regime in Korea was from the multi-currency basket system to the market average foreign
exchange rate system in March 1990. Under the new exchange rate regime, the fluctuate
limitation of foreign exchange transactions were based on daily exchange rate fluctuations, and
because of this their movements failed to fully reflect the pressures for exchange rate change. As
a result, there were frequent cases of foreign exchange rate misalignment and Korea fell victim to
speculative attacks, which was what finally led to the crisis. To make the exchange rate better
reflected the economic fundamentals and to stave off the speculative attack on currency and the
financial market, the Korean government completely abolished the limit on daily fluctuations and
adopted a free-floating exchange rate system in December 1997, allowing the won exchange rate
to be determined by market supply and demand (see Kim, 2003, p. 5).
The Japanese government formally adopted a floating exchange rate system in 1973. Foreign
exchange transactions were liberalized in 1980 when New Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law was implemented, although there are some restrictions still remained. The yen was
internationalized through the establishment of an off-shore market and the deregulation of the
Euro–yen in December 1986.
2.3. Enlargement of the business scope of financial institutions
The three economies display significant differences in their approaches to liberalizing the
deregulation of the scope of financial institutions. In Taiwan, the government had strictly
restricted on new entry to the financial business and expanded the business scope of financial
institutions until the early 1990s, and all banks were either owned or partly owned by the
government. In July 1989, the Taiwanese government accounting to the Banking Law
amendment began to allow new applications for the establishment of financial institutions and
permitted them to diversify their business scope. In addition, it also allowed foreign banks to
engage in more financial operations, such as savings and trust business, but denied non-banking
financial institutions (NBFIs) the same privilege. Furthermore, to improve the efficiency of
government banks, in May 1991, the Taiwanese government started privatization of banks by
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selling part of shares in major commercial banks. After opening domestic banking market,
Taiwanese interest rate and foreign exchange rate had been completely determined by market
forces.
However, since 16 private commercial banks was established in 1991, the number of domestic
banks had increased from 24 in 1990 to 47 in 1997 and 53 in 2001. The average rate of return on
the net worth (ROE) for the banks dropped tremendously from 20.79% in 1990 to 3.61% and
7.35% in 2001 and 2002, respectively. The non-performing loans (NPL) rose from 0.93% of
total loans in 1990 to 5.34% and 7.48% in 2000 and 2001, respectively (see Table 1). Over
banking phenomenon came out.
In order to solve the over banking problem, the government had undergone significant changes
in financial reforms. Firstly, in order to raise the competitiveness of financial institutions, the
Financial Institutions Merger Law was promulgated in December 2000. Secondly, to effectively
handle unhealthy financial institutions, the financial restructuring fund was set up in July 2001.
Thirdly, to raise the overall operational efficiency of financial system and promote the soundly
development of the financial market, the Financial Holding Company Act was enacted and
formally implemented in November 2001. The Act provides banks, securities firms and insurance
companies with a mechanism for cross-industry operations. As of August 2003, the government
has approved the application of 14 financial institutions to set up financial holding companies.
In Korea, the government had removed entry barriers and eased restriction on business scope
of financial institutions earlier than Taiwan and Japan. The privatization of commercial banks
started in 1982 and was completed by 1983, the commercial banks began to enjoy more freedom
over both interest rates and credit allocation. However continued government control of interest
rates at all banks in the period, along with high proportion of non-performing bank loans and
heavy dependence on the Bank of Korea for low-cost funds to support their outstanding loans,
had left the privately owned commercial banks very vulnerable. A substantial of their outstanding
loans had been still policy-related. The banks could not afford to ignore the government’s
suggestions, despite their shift to private ownership (see Smith, 2000).
In contrast with the restriction on the operations of commercial banks, unlike Taiwan, Korean
government had permitted established various NBFIs, such as investment and finance companies
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Table 1
Non-performing loans ratio (%) at banking sectors of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan
Taiwan Korea Japana
1980 4.68
1990 0.93 2.1
1995 2.85 0.9 3.5
1996 3.68 3.9 6.0
1997 3.70 14.9
1998 4.36 16.8 5.38
1999 4.88 12.9 6.16
2000 5.34 8.0 5.93
2001 7.48 3.4 6.26
2002 6.12 2.3 8.44
Source. The data for Taiwan are from Financial Statistics Monthly, Central Bank of China. For Korea, the data of 1996–
1997, figures are from Ji and Park (1999, p. 32), and other figures are from He (2004, Table 1). For Japan, the figures in
1995 and 1996 are from Taniuchi (1997, Table 1), and other figures are from Japanese Bankers Association, analysis of
financial statements of all banks, various issues.
a Data are for 31 March of year shown, which is the fiscal year-end.
and mutual savings and finance companies, and allowed them to diversify their business scope
between 1982 and 1992. As NBFIs had always been privately owned and had been both less
controlled and less protected by the government, the amount of NBFIs increased significantly. As a
result, the number of domestic banks increased slowly from15 in 1981 to 21 in 1990 and26 in 1997,
then decreased to 15 in 2001. The banking sector’s share of deposits decreased from 43.3% in 1980
to 20.4% in 1997(see Ji & Park, 1999, Table 2). The share of NBFIs, in contrast, increased from
35.6% in 1980 to 63% in 1997. The NBFIs occupied significant proportion in the financial market.
However, due to the fact that Korean chaebols owned most of the non-bank financial sector,
they relied increasingly on non-bank financial institutions for their investment needs.
Particularly, chaebols were largely dependent on short-term debt for financing their investment,
which rapidly increased their short-term liability. The results of overexpansion led firms to
deteriorate their financial structure. Poor financial structure and high interest payment as well as
domestic economic recession had resulted in a chain of chaebol bankruptcies in early 1997.
After the crisis, in April 1998, the Korean government announced the basic framework of
financial sector restructuring. Korean government had taken a series of measures to improve the
financial situation, including lowering the debt ratio of chaebols, eliminating cross-debt guarantee,
concentrating on core business, and purchase of non-performing loans, etc. (Chopra et al., 2001).
Also, to facilitate the financial sector reform, several financial supervisory authorities were created
ormodified. For example, the Financial SupervisoryCommission (FSC)was created and theKorea
Asset Management Corporation (KAMC) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC)
were modified. To help financial institutions dispose of their non-performing assets, the Non-
performing Loans Management Fund was set up under the umbrella of the KAMC. The Financial
HoldingCompanyActwas also passed to promote universal banking inOctober 2000.Asof the end
of September 2001, three financial holding companies had been established.6
Since 1948, Japan had followed the U.S. policy of separating securities activities from
banking activities. Banks were prohibited from underwriting, trading equities and corporate
bonds except public sector bonds such as government bonds, and security companies were
prohibited from conducting banking business including foreign exchange transactions.
After 1975, to offset fiscal deficits, Japanese government began to issue large scale revenue-
financing bonds and forced banks to raise the share of bonds in their portfolios. The increase in
the supply of government bonds also encouraged the development of money market.7 This made
it difficult for the Japanese government to maintain deposit rate cellings and therefore allowed
banks to issue CDs in May 1979. The Japanese government gradually deregulated financial
system in 1980s. For example, private banks and postal savings were allowed to sell government
bonds in 1983 and 1988, respectively. Bank dealings of all types of bonds and the participation of
foreign institutions in government bond syndicates were allowed in 1984. Foreign banks were
able to participate in domestic trust business in 1985. And from August 1987 the U.S. banks
could do securities business. However, due to the fact that firms could choose more freely among
alternative fund sources, many Japanese companies had financed their funding needs in the
capital markets rather than through bank lending in the late 1980s.8 Thus, there existed
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4Table 2
Sequence of financial liberalization (1973–2001)
1973 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Domestic
Interest rate deregulation
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Banking system development
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Capital market development
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
External
Foreign exchange rate deregulation
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Removal of trade barriers
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Removal of capital control
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Note. An ‘‘ ’’ represents major measures undertaken that year and ‘‘ ’’ represents the liberalization to be complete in that year.
competition of firms’ borrowing in financial markets. To survive, banks tried to maintain loan
outstanding. This caused banks to look for new borrowers, such as construction companies, real
estate developers and non-banking finance companies on which they had not learned enough
credit information. This is one of the reasons why Japanese banks have accumulated huge bad
loans (see Honda, 2003, p. 137).
As the bubble’s collapsed, the Japanese economy slumped into the long stagnation in the
1990s. To solve this stagnation, the government began to encourage financial reform. In 1992,
the Financial Reform Law was approved and financial institutions were allowed to enter into
other kinds of financial business by establishing subsidiaries. For example, banks were
allowed to engage in securities business through their subsidiaries. Banks also could conduct
trust businesses either through trust-bank subsidiaries or by themselves. The government
allowed securities companies to set up trust-bank subsidiaries from 1993. And the
pension fund market was opened in 1995. Finally in 1996 all rules regarding bond issues were
lifted.
In late 1996, the government revealed a plan to reform financial markets and institutions, and
to create a free, fair and global financial system. The financial system reform is so-called
Japanese Big Bang. Under the Big Bang reform, Japanese banks had established bank holding
companies that own a securities subsidiary since March 1998. Furthermore, banks had been
allowed to sell investment trusts at their counters since December 1998. There were also limits on
the scope of businesses permitted bank’s securities and trust subsidiaries. But these restrictions
were totally abolished from October 1999. Also, banks conducted insurance business through
subsidiaries from October 2000. Furthermore, revision to the Insurance Businesses Law in 2000
made possible for banks to engage in retail sales of certain kinds of insurance products from April
2001.
Although the Japanese government began to engage financial reform earlier than Taiwan and
Korea, however, the reform still went slowly. The quick rising in non-performing loans led to
Japan’s banking crisis burst in late 1997 and early 1998. The banking sector NPL ratio in Japan
increased from 3.5% in March 1995 to 5.38% and 6.26% in March 1998 and March 2001,
respectively. The disposal of non-performing loans is lagging behind Korea (see Table 1).
2.4. Liberalization of capital movement
In capital movement liberalization the three countries also differed significantly. In Taiwan, to
promote the liberalization policy and capital market expansion, the liberalization of the securities
market started in January 1988, when the Securities and Exchange Law was revised to lift the
restriction of the establishment of new securities companies. The OTC transaction was permitted
in 1989. Taiwanese government also approved foreign investors to invest limited amount in the
domestic stock market since September 1990. However, the participation of foreign investors in
the Taiwan stock market was allowed to increase gradually and slowly. In the stock markets, the
maximum investment quota for each qualified foreign institutional investor was U.S. $600
million before November 1999. In December 2002, it was raised to U.S. $3 billion and was
released in 2004.
In Korea, the government allowed direct foreign investment in stocks markets in 1981 for the
first time.9 In the 1980s, foreigners were only allowed to invest in stocks through vehicles such as
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beneficiary certificates for foreigners and country funds. However, to join the OECD, Korea’s
financial liberalization and market opening had been accelerated since the early 1990s.10 By that
time, Korea’s interest rates and exchange rate policy were not completely liberalized. The
branches of foreign securities companies and joint venture securities companies were permitted
to set up in November 1991. Foreign investors were allowed to invest directly in stocks listed on
the Korea Stocks Exchange in January 1992, which was later than Taiwan in 1991. The
government expanded the investment ceilings on foreign investment in Korea stocks several
times until it reached 55% in December 1997. And it was completely abolished in May 1998,
according to the IMF program, except for investment in public corporations (see Lee, Lee, &
Yang, 2001, p. 17). In 1994, Korean government lifted restrictions on short-term foreign
borrowing by financial institutions and corporates, but retained controls on long-term borrowing.
However, foreign firms could list on the Korea stock exchange in 1996. Foreigners were also able
to engage in stock price index future transactions with the opening of this market at the same year.
In April 1999, the Foreign Exchange Control Act was abolished and the external transactions of
companies and foreign exchange banks were almost fully liberalized. Individuals external
transactions such as external remittances were also liberalized as of January 2001.
The initial opening of the Korean bond market took place in July 1994 relatively later than the
stock market, with foreign investment being allowed in convertible bonds issued by small and
medium enterprises. All restrictions on foreign investment in listed bonds were finally abolished
in December 1997. In May 1998, foreign investment in short-term financial products issued was
also permitted.
In Japan, outward foreign direct investment was liberalized in June 1972, while inward direct
investment was liberalized with exception of five categories of business in May 1973. Since
1976, the Japanese government had issued deficit bonds in large quantities, and this resulted in
relaxing the restriction on financial market. Both primary and secondary bond markets expanded
rapidly. Foreign exchange transactions were liberalized in December 1980, although some
restrictions still remained. These include the following: extending non-residents’ eligibility to
issue Euro–yen bonds to some foreign private corporations, abolishing the withholding tax on
non-residents’ interest earnings on Euro–yen bonds issued by Japanese residents, giving foreign
banks access to the Euro–yen bond market, and relaxing restrictions on Euro–yen lending to
residents. The Japanese bond futures market was established in 1985. Both the U.S. and other
foreign brokers become Tokyo Stock Exchange members. The Foreign Exchange Act was
revised in 1997, which removed most international capital controls. Capital account and foreign
exchange transaction were fully liberalized in April 1998.
2.5. Stylized facts
Based on the above discussion, we summarized the sequence of financial liberalization process
of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan in Table 2. FromTable 2, we could find that the financial liberalization
process in Taiwan comparingwith that in Japan andKorea during the last two decades followed the
order suggested byMcKinnon (1991) to transform the economy from a financial control economy
to a market-oriented one. Although capital movements were liberalized much later in Taiwan,
however, Taiwan’s deregulation of financial system had followed an appropriate sequence.
Before the opening of international market, Taiwan had just begun to deregulate the domestic
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financial industry and to decontrol its domestic market. It had also followed an appropriate
sequence to open up its financial account. The current account should be liberalized before the
financial account, and long-term capital before short-term capital. While, Korea and Japan
liberalized its domestic financial sector after external liberalization, in particularly, the removal of
controls on international capital markets before interest rate liberalization.
This conservative liberalization policy together with the partial deregulation of capital
movement allowed the Taiwan economy to be free from the serious attack of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1998. For example, from the end of June 1997 to the end of June 1998, the New
Taiwan dollar against the U.S. dollar depreciated only 19.04% much less than the currencies of
Korea (35.34%). Although Japan’s currency only depreciated by 18.25%, the Taiwanese stock
price dropped by only 12.37% much less than that of Japan (20.82%) and Korea (60.04%).11 The
bank’s average ROE in Taiwan decreased 11.36% in 1996 to 9.29% in 1998, while in Korea from
3.8% to 52.53% and in Japan from 3.35% to 12.37% in the same period. The non-
performing loan ratio for the banking sector increased from 3.68% in 1996 to 4.36% in 1998
lower than those in Korea (increased from 3.9% to 16.8%) and Japan (increased from 6.0% to
5.38%). Taiwanese average real GDP growth rate remained at 5.79% between 1996 and 1998,
which was much higher than that of Korea (1.72%) and Japan (1.03%) in the same period.
In order to further track the expansion of financial development in the three economies, we
calculated four indicators of banking market development and four indicators of stock market
development, which were commonly adopted in the literature.12 Table 3 demonstrated the
expansion of the banking sector development in the three nations during the period of 1981–2001.
The first indicator, the number of domestic bank, is a rough measure of the level of banking
development. The second indicator—M2GDP is defined as the ratio ofM2 (broad money stock) to
nominalGDP,which is to capture the overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector. This is
a typical indicator of financial depth (see Goldsmith, 1969; King & Levine, 1993a). The third
indicator, Private Credit, equals bank claims on the private sector divided by GDP. The measure
excludes loans issued to governments and public enterprises. It also excludes credits issued by the
central bank. It indicates the share of credit funneled through the private sector (see Beck et al.,
2000; Levine et al., 2000). The fourth measure of banking development, Commercial–Central
Bank, is defined as the ratio of bank domestic assets to total assets of bank and the central bank. It
measures the degree to which commercial banks or the central bank in allocating the society’s
savings (see Beck et al., 2000). Table 3 also shows that the number of domestic banks,M2GDP and
Private Credit inKoreawere far less than those in Taiwan and Japan over the period. Also, it depicts
a trend of increase in M2GDP and Private Credit for the three nations.
Table 4 reports the evolution of stock market development in these three economies. The first
indicator is the number of listed companies. The second indicator is Market Capitalization,
which equals the ratio of the market value of listed shares to GDP. This is a typical measure of
stock market size. The third indicator is defined as the variable Turnover, which equals the
value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges divided by total value of listed shares.
Turnover measures the value of stock transactions relative to the size of the market, and it is
frequently used as a measure of market liquidity (see Demirgu¨c-Kunt & Levine, 1996a, 1996b,
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11 All the exchange rates are collected from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF except the exchange rate of
Taiwan. The exchange rate of New Taiwan dollar against the U.S. dollar was obtained from the Financial Statistics
published by the Central Bank of China in Taiwan.
12 See King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Levine (1997) and Beck et al. (2000).
1996c). The fourth indicator of stock market development is Stock Return. It is defined as the
rate of growth of the nominal stock price index which is the measure of stock market returns. It
measures the nominal rate of return from holding the index portfolio of each country’s major
stock exchange.
In the three nations, Taiwanese listed companies increased by four times from 1980 to 2001.
The number of listed companies shows an increasing trend in all three economies over the period.
The Japanese stock market was largest in numbers, while Korea’s turnover ratio of listed stocks
was the largest among three economies but its stock market capitalization ratio was the smallest.
The volatility of stock price index in Japan was lower than those in Korea and Taiwan.
3. Methodology and data
To explore the effect of financial development on economic growth in the three economies, we
followed the growthmodel of Odedokun (1996). It is based on the standard neoclassical one-sector
aggregate production in which financial development constitutes an input. The specification is the
following:
Yt ¼ FðLt;Kt;Ft; ZtÞ; (1)
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Table 3
Indicators of the banking system development in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan
Number of
domestic banks
M2GDP (%) Private Credit (%) Commercial–Central
Bank
Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan
1981 23 15a 157 63.78 33.07 86.82 51.74 42.79 132.61 85.49 78.89 94.40
1982 24 157 74.01 36.57 89.60 56.43 46.61 139.02 85.70 80.55 94.00
1983 24 157 84.65 35.92 92.05 61.72 46.72 144.37 89.83 79.85 93.76
1984 24 156 91.09 33.84 91.50 64.33 46.69 145.02 93.61 78.78 94.41
1985 24 156 106.44 35.13 92.39 65.71 49.87 146.88 97.02 78.40 94.41
1986 24 155 115.54 35.67 97.58 60.67 45.94 154.91 97.36 78.47 94.85
1987 24 155 121.27 36.22 102.67 65.37 44.23 169.25 97.60 76.18 95.08
1988 24 155 134.04 37.04 105.16 84.87 43.40 178.51 99.60 76.81 95.40
1989 24 155 141.91 39.57 108.29 94.75 47.41 184.67 97.18 80.30 94.97
1990 24 21 154 143.99 38.43 109.95 100.58 48.47 191.59 96.27 81.65 94.51
1991 25 23 153 153.89 38.68 106.64 109.12 116.46 192.73 96.14 83.15 94.46
1992 40 24 151 165.08 39.18 105.41 126.58 121.49 199.64 97.14 82.38 94.16
1993 41 24 150 171.84 38.61 107.65 136.21 120.41 203.12 97.34 82.21 94.66
1994 42 24 150 181.06 39.15 108.55 144.91 128.17 203.10 96.84 84.77 94.75
1995 42 25 149 182.47 38.60 109.41 146.81 131.69 201.35 96.64 87.08 94.57
1996 42 25 146 182.00 39.75 108.51 142.24 138.67 200.40 96.70 90.11 93.98
1997 47 26 146 181.74 41.44 110.39 142.88 155.01 190.59 97.28 81.01 93.27
1998 48 20 138 184.13 53.41 116.82 144.12 165.22 195.17 97.03 86.37 88.55
1999 52 17 137 191.95 62.19 122.89 141.14 156.40 203.43 96.86 92.10 86.42
2000 53 17 136 196.60 71.38 122.14 138.28 141.08 191.14 98.12 95.46 87.38
2001 53 15 133 208.91 75.16 129.06 135.73 143.85 189.85 97.22 96.52 85.98
Sources. The data for Korea and Japan are from OECD Bank Profitability Statistics: Financial Statements of Banks Web
site (http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal) and International Financial Statistics. For Taiwan, the figures are from
Financial Statistics Monthly, Central Bank of China.
a The figure is in 1980.
where the subscript t refers to time, Y is real output or real GDP, L is labor,K is physical capital, F
represents the level of financial development, Z represents other factors associated with
economic growth.
By taking differentiation of Eq. (1), after appropriately manipulating and rearranging, Eq. (1)
could be expressed as
Y˙t ¼ b0 þ b1L˙t þ b2
It
Yt
þ b3F˙t þ b4Z˙t þ ut; (2)
where Y˙t, L˙t, It/Yt, F˙t and Z˙t represents the growth rate of real GDP, the rate of labor force growth,
the investment rate, financial development indicators and other factors, respectively. ut is the
error term. Eq. (2) is our estimating equation, where the investment rate is the proxy of capital
growth. It is the ratio of fixed-capital investment to GDP. The labor force growth is proxied by
employment growth. The financial development indicators and other factors are explained
below.
We follow the standard practice in the literature and measure financial development by
aggregate variables that reflect bank versus market based structures (see Demirgu¨c-Kunt &
Levine, 2001). For the bank-based, we used three indicators measures, which are commonly
adopted in the literature: M2GDP, Private Credit, and Commercial–Central Bank. Regarding the
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Table 4
Indicators of stock market development in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan
Number of listed
companies
Market Capitalization
(%)
Turnover (%) Stock Return (%)
Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan Taiwan Korea Japan
1981 107 343 1412 11.35 6.08 34.81 10.28 79.2 50.00 0.35 16.27 15.42
1982 113 334 1427 10.69 5.38 35.64 6.76 65.5 34.60 13.05 3.52 4.10
1983 119 328 1441 14.57 5.32 44.26 14.28 56.36 44.30 37.11 0.36 23.26
1984 123 336 1444 16.66 6.85 52.54 9.54 69.22 42.50 33.35 8.28 24.81
1985 127 342 1476 16.80 7.82 57.25 6.81 72.27 48.00 14.54 5.23 14.89
1986 130 355 1499 19.21 12.23 83.08 16.21 110.81 75.10 26.71 64.23 48.31
1987 141 389 1532 42.82 22.73 92.75 26.75 129.89 96.10 125.99 82.92 10.89
1988 163 502 1571 96.03 47.07 122.49 29.50 154.14 98.10 143.66 66.17 36.57
1989 181 626 1597 156.75 61.70 144.62 52.35 111.85 73.10 65.62 32.68 22.25
1990 199 669 1627 62.27 42.33 84.23 45.87 68.57 38.40 21.36 18.80 39.83
1991 221 686 1641 66.19 32.35 79.41 28.53 82.38 28.40 27.25 11.80 1.10
1992 256 688 1651 47.67 32.89 60.21 14.63 133.42 19.90 13.33 10.98 23.74
1993 285 693 1667 86.94 38.76 67.38 22.97 186.55 25.90 1.33 24.35 10.07
1994 313 699 1689 100.63 44.45 72.84 32.77 174.04 24.90 48.36 32.53 8.32
1995 347 721 1714 72.79 35.39 72.94 20.18 105.11 26.80 11.34 3.15 1.19
1996 382 760 1766 98.00 26.16 67.21 21.56 97.26 28.90 8.30 10.86 6.77
1997 404 776 1805 116.75 14.45 53.62 31.66 137.3 30.70 40.09 21.47 20.12
1998 437 748 1838 94.13 28.46 53.38 22.70 274.8 35.20 8.00 37.96 7.49
1999 462 725 1892 127.51 66.01 90.14 22.18 467.05 44.10 4.02 98.69 58.44
2000 531 704 2055 85.22 32.50 69.95 17.38 387.45 49.20 5.66 9.00 25.46
2001 584 689 2103 108.47 41.13 59.54 14.92 599.83 59.20 37.46 21.98 19.59
Sources. The data for Korea and Japan are from Korea National Statistical Office Web site (http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng)
and Tokyo Stock Exchange. For Taiwan, the figures are from Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC).
market-based, three indicators were utilized, i.e. Market Captialization, Turnover, and Stock
Return. These measures of financial development variables were described in Section 2.13
In order to compare the strength of the independent link between financial intermediary sector
development and economic growth with that of the development of stock markets and economic
growth, we also considered other potential determinants of economic growth in our regressions.
Other variables are measured as follows. The inflation rate and the ratio of government
consumption to GDPwere the indicators to measure the macroeconomic stability (see Beck et al.,
2000). The inflation rate is defined as the change rate of CPI.14 Real export growth was calculated
as the annual growth rate of real exports of goods and services. And the growth rate of real export
is to capture the degree of openness of an economy.
In addition to the financial development variables, we considered two variables that may
capture the effect of international capital mobility on economic growth. One variable is capital
outflow to GDP ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of outward foreign direct
investment and portfolio investment assets to GDP. Another variable is capital inflow and GDP
ratio, which equals the sum of inward direct investment and portfolio investment liabilities to
GDP.
Finally, as structural changes may have occurred in all three economies during the study
period, two dummy variables had been introduced to capture the structural change. We focus
on the effects of financial crisis and foreign exchange system change date. A financial crisis
dummy variable (Crisis Dummy) equals 1 for the Asian financial crisis period 1997:3–
1998:2, and 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable (Dummy) takes a value one when the
country’s exchange rate system was converted, and zero otherwise. For Taiwan and Korea,
the exchange rate system change test started from 1987:3 and 1990:1, respectively. For Japan,
the change test started from 1986:4 when the yen was internationalized. The experience has
shown that the exchange rate policy is crucial to the success of liberalization. Usually
liberalization leads to capital flows (see Gibson & Tsakalotos, 1994). To capture the effect of
international capital mobility, we considered an interactive term between a dummy (Dummy)
and capital outflow or inflow, respectively, in order to find the differential effect. In the
empirical analysis below, all variables were expressed in logarithms, except for the growth
rate and dummy variable.
Since most of the variables under study are likely to be endogenous, the OLS estimators are
inconsistent.15 To overcome the difficulty, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM)
techniques, which can deal with the possible simultaneity between financial development and
economic growth. One and four-period-lagged dependent and independent variables are used as
instruments. The estimated coefficients are consistent. All standard errors of estimates are
corrected with the Newey and West (1987) procedure and thereby are heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent. We examine the appropriateness of the instruments with Hansen’s
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13 This paper is more careful than past studies in financial development measures, when using a ratio of stock and a flow
variable. Due to financial balance sheet items are measured at the end of the period, GDP is measured over the period. As
yearly data are used, some authors partially correct this problem by using an average of period t and period t  1 of
balance sheet items and divide it by the GDP of period t (e.g., King & Levine, 1993a, 1993b). This, however, does not
fully resolve distortions, especially in using quarterly data. We divide the financial balance sheet items in quarter by the
GDP value measured in quarter, where GDP is adjusted at annual rates.
14 Fischer (1991, 1993) suggested that macroeconomic instability was negatively associated with economic growth.
15 For example, in our regressions, it is likely that financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth be
simultaneously determined or that financial depth may feed back into the growth.
(1982) test of the overidentifying restrictions. The instruments are appropriate if we cannot reject
the null hypothesis.16
The data for the three nations are quarterly data over the period from 1981:1 to 2001:3. We
choose 1981:1 as starting point partly due to the fact that Korea and Taiwan started their market
liberalization regimes in 1981 and partly due to the limitation of data. The sources of data utilized
in this study are reported in Appendix A of the paper.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 5 summarizes some of themacroeconomic trends. Taiwan andKorea have higher average
growth rates with 6.87% and 7.34%, respectively. Korea and Japan have higher average fixed-
capital investment to GDP ratio, which were 30.29% and 28.30%, respectively. It is usually
suggested that investment share of GDP is the engine of economic development. Although Taiwan
has achieved higher economic growth than Japan, Taiwanese average investment ratio was only
three-fourth ofKorea and Japan.Hence, highgrowth rateswere not necessarily associatedwith high
investment ratios. However, Taiwan and Korea had achieved higher export growth than Japan. It
seems that high rate of economic growth were accompanied by even higher rates of export growth.
As for the inflation rate, Taiwan and Japan had maintained stable price levels. Furthermore, the
capital outflow to GDP ratio in Korea was lower than those in Taiwan and Japan.
Table 6 shows the correlations between different measures of financial development and real
GDP growth rate in these three economies. In Taiwan, the correlations between the economic
growth rate and Commercial–Central Bank is only 0.08, while the correlations between the
economic growth rate and other financial development indicators are within the range 0.05 to
0.42. In Korea, the correlations between the economic growth rate and Market Capitalization is
only 0.11, while the correlations between the economic growth rate and other financial deve-
lopment indicators arewithin the range0.02 to0.42. Finally, the correlation between economic
growth rate and all financial development indicators in Japan are within the range 0.37 to 0.51.
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Table 5
Statistics summary (unit: %)
Variables Country
Taiwan Korea Japan
The growth rate of real GDP 6.87 (3.05) 7.34 (4.25) 2.67 (2.06)
Fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio 20.81 (3.44) 30.29 (5.01) 28.30 (1.88)
Employment growth rate 1.79 (1.45) 2.20 (2.96) 0.18 (1.73)
Real government consumption as
share of real GDP
15.99 (2.30) 11.27 (2.19) 14.87 (0.73)
The growth rate of real export 9.40 (9.02) 13.20 (9.15) 4.62 (6.00)
Inflation 2.79 (3.74) 5.73 (4.45) 1.37 (1.50)
Capital outflow to GDP ratio 2.24 (2.08) 0.77 (0.80) 2.87 (1.95)
Capital inflow to GDP ratio 1.45 (1.99) 1.88 (2.04) 1.29 (1.68)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard error.
16 The software package used in this paper is Rats 5.0.
In addition, the correlation between M2GDP and both Commercial–Central Bank and Private
Credit in Taiwan and Korea are within the range 0.70–0.97 and 0.79–0.82, respectively. The
correlation between M2GDP and Private Credit is 0.80 in Japan. It should be noted that M2GDP
can be regarded as liquidity of banks as well as finance-size. Due to these variables are highly
correlated over the sample period, multicollinearity might be serious in these nations. In addition,
due to the function of banking system are not the only create money but also provide fund channel
to the government, public or private enterprises. Using only one banking development indicator,
however, may not be closely related to the complete information of financial services provided by
banks. To solve the problem, we will follow Beck, Demirgu¨c-Kunt, Levine, and Maksimovic
(2001) and utilize the method of principal components to find out the principal components of the
highly correlated financial indicators in the particular category.17 Finance-aggregate, an
alternative measure of financial intermediary, is a conglomerate indicator of the overall size,
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Table 6
Correlations between the growth rate of real GDP and financial market development
The growth
rate of real
GDP
Financial intermediary
development
Stock market development
M2GDP Commercial–
Central Bank
Private
Credit
Market
Capitalization
Turnover Stock
Return
Taiwan
The growth rate of real
GDP
1.00
M2GDP 0.36 1.00
Commercial–Central Bank 0.08 0.70 1.00
Private Credit 0.42 0.97 0.55 1.00
Market Capitalization 0.17 0.74 0.60 0.68 1.00
Turnover 0.05 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.72 1.00
Stock Return 0.34 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04 1.00
Korea
The growth rate of real
GDP
1.00
M2GDP 0.23 1.00
Commercial–Central Bank 0.14 0.82 1.00
Private Credit 0.42 0.79 0.79 1.00
Market Capitalization 0.11 0.42 0.47 0.52 1.00
Turnover 0.15 0.67 0.55 0.73 0.51 1.00
Stock Return 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.0010 0.33 1.00
Japan
The growth rate of real
GDP
1.00
M2GDP 0.37 1.00
Commercial–Central Bank 0.51 0.50 1.00
Private Credit 0.20 0.80 0.03 1.00
Market Capitalization – – – – – –
Turnover – – – – – –
Stock Return 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.36 1.00
17 The estimation software package used is SAS 6.12.
activity, and efficiency of financial intermediaries. Specifically, it is the first principal component
of M2 to GDP ratio, Private Credit, and Commercial–Central Bank.18 The principal component
analysis has just followed that of Jolliffe (1986).
Furthermore, the correlation between the change rate of stock price index and both stock
market capitalization ratio and turnover ratio are 0.10 and 0.04 in Taiwan and 0.0002 and 0.33
in Korea, respectively.
4.2. Regression results
Before estimation, to ensure stationarity of the data, we performed the augumented Dickey–
Fuller (ADF) unit-root test on the utilized variables and reported in Table 7. As we can see, most
of the variables are stationary in level. Table 8 reports the GMM estimation results for these
economies. The last row in each table reports p values for the Hansen test which cannot reject the
null of overidentifying restrictions. That is, the null hypothesis that the instruments are
appropriate cannot be rejected.
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Table 7
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests for level variables
Taiwan Korea Japan
Intercept Intercept
and trend
Intercept Intercept
and trend
Intercept Intercept
and trend
The growth rate of real
GDP
3.4358(3)a 4.5074(3)a 4.2600(3)a 4.7248(3)a 2.5675(0) 3.3612(3)b
Fixed-capital investment
to GDP ratio
7.3075(0)a 9.3651(0)a 3.4270(0)a 3.5010(0)a 2.4410(7) 2.0784(7)
The employment growth
rate
3.6602(3)a 5.8556(3)a 5.8565(0)a 6.0317(0)a 2.0677(2) 3.2874(2)b
Real government
consumption as
share of real GDP
2.0293(0) 4.6842(0)a 3.9597(0)a 8.9871(0)a 0.4864(5) 0.6567(5)
The growth rate of real
export
6.1755(3)a 6.6349(3)a 5.0376(3)a 4.9164(3)a 6.1205(3)a 6.0313(2)a
Inflation 6.2386(1)a 6.2386(1)a 6.1621(2)a 5.9856(2)a 3.4569(0)a 4.5828(0)a
Finance-aggregate 4.9568(1)a 3.1473(7)b 0.7584(0) 4.2982(1)a 0.7375(2) 2.3768(0)
Market Capitalization 2.1259(7) 1.9220(7) 2.0029(8) 2.1696(4)
Turnover 2.7643(0)b 3.0271(0) 3.7062(0)a 5.3309(0)a
Stock Return 9.9473(0)a 10.0950(0)a 9.1599(0)a 9.2210(0)a 3.7715(3)a 4.4641(3)a
Capital outflow to GDP
ratio
2.4255(0) 3.3741(0)a 5.0297(1)a 6.3745(1)a 5.3654(0)a 5.3467(0)a
Capital inflow to GDP
ratio
3.8896(1)a 5.1645(1)a 5.1737(0)a 7.1696(0)a 8.3093(0)a 8.4349(0)a
Note. The figures in parentheses denote the number of lags that were selected by minimum Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). The critical values are from Fuller (1976, p. 373). The statistics for all the first differences are not reported because
there is statistically significant.
a Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at critical value of 5%.
b Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at critical value of 10%.
18 The principal components analysis results in three principal components, the first principal component that accounts
for 85.75% of overall variance in Taiwan. While, in Korea and Japan, they explain 86.98% and 65.26% of the total
variances, respectively.
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Table 8
Regressions on economic growth rate
Variable Country
Taiwan Korea Japan
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Fixed-capital investment to
GDP ratio
0.9400 (0.6200) 0.4726 (0.4781) 3.4165* (1.7869) 3.2462** (1.1445) 38.0438** (4.7952) 37.7683** (4.0858)
The employment growth rate 0.9886** (0.1349) 0.9862** (0.1112) 0.7504** (0.1828) 0.1838** (0.0863) 0.5021** (0.0878) 0.4856** (0.0815)
Real government consumption
as share of real GDP
9.7850** (1.3983) 3.5495** (1.2643) 14.7312** (1.7361) 8.5568** (1.7090) 23.9500** (7.3584) 25.8226** (5.8537)
The growth rate of real export 0.1915** (0.0195) 0.1722** (0.0141) 0.1652** (0.0278) 0.2244** (0.0244) 0.0276 (0.0181) 0.0262 (0.0173)
Inflation 6.9318 (8.4650) 16.2538** (8.1114) 64.1648** (11.6693) 31.6344** (8.0194) 1.0312** (0.3075) 0.7993** (0.3018)
Finance-aggregate 0.3084** (0.1407) 0.3605** (0.1034) 0.3977 (0.2537) 0.2691 (0.1693) 1.3168** (0.1605) 1.1696** (0.1975)
Market Capitalization 1.9266** (0.2542) 1.6470** (0.1949) 3.2865** (0.7880) 2.8241** (0.4214)
Turnover 0.6303** (0.1903) 0.3254 (0.2148) 3.8861** (0.5561) 3.0142** (0.4649)
Stock Return 0.0047** (0.0021) 0.0052** (0.0016) 0.0242 (0.0195) 0.0104 (0.0147) 0.0248** (0.0057) 0.0259** (0.0068)
Capital outflow to GDP
ratio  Dummy
48.1729** (8.6992) 89.3626** (29.7215) 2.3879 (5.1238)
Capital inflow to GDP
ratio  Dummy
11.0679 (8.9767) 1.5651 (11.2323) 4.7652 (8.9480)
Crisis Dummy 0.5255 (0.3328) 7.6460** (1.1856) 0.7537** (0.3402)
R¯
2 0.8115 0.8466 0.4928 0.7168 0.6011 0.6034
P value of Hansen test 0.9483 0.8834 0.9428 0.9181 0.7333 0.7546
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. **Significant at the 5% level. All regressions have an intercept which is not report. Inflation is log(1 + inflation rate) for the
period.
In Table 8, Column (1) reports the economic growth effects of those variables such as the
fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio, the employment growth rate, real government
consumption as share of real GDP, the growth rate of real export, inflation rate, finance-
aggregate, Market Capitalization, Turnover, and Stock Return.19 Column (2) further includes
Crisis Dummy and the interactive term between Dummy and capital outflow and inflow,
respectively.
Table 8 shows that, as expected, all coefficients of growth rates of employment and real export
are statistically significant. This implies that both employment and real export have contributed
to economic growth. As for the effect of fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio, in each country it
behaves differently. The estimated coefficient of fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio is
significantly positive in Japan, while it becomes significantly negative in Korea and is little or
even become negative in Taiwan. The fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio is not a significant
factor for accounting for the economic growth over the past two decades in Taiwan and Korea.
One possible reason for these might effects may be due to that investment did not exhibit dynamic
efficiency among these countries. The other reason was that investment only exhibited effect on
GDP, but it did not reveal growth effect. The finding is consistent with what Lin, Lee, and Huang
(1996) had got using Taiwan’s and Korea’s data. In other words, there might exist overinvestment
during the study period. It should be noted that the national investment includes private and
public investment.
In addition, the finance-aggregate variable has a positive and significant effect on economic
growth in Taiwan, while it becomes insignificant or the sign of the coefficient even negative in
Korea and Japan cases.20 This may be due to the relative stability of financial system and
appropriate sequence to financial liberalization in Taiwan from 1980 as discussed in Section 2.
However, Japanese banking system in these periods, dominated by large banks, had been
suffering from serious problems with non-performing loans since the bursting of the stock
market and urban real estate bubbles at the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, the
Japanese economy slumped into the long stagnation. To solve the problem, the Japanese
government started to encourage financial reforms. However, it was clear that the financial
reform was not sufficient to terminate the stagnation in the early 1990s. Being delay by
regulatory authorities and due to the fact that the Japanese banks had an intertwined relationship
with the government the Japan economy had been led to a banking crisis burst in the late 1990.
Similarly, Korea’s banks also had an intertwined relationship with the government. And many
financial reforms just followed Japan’s steps. Moreover, to join the OECD and to meet the
OECD’s requirements, without taking account of financial structural imperfections, the process
of financial deregulation not only continued but also had been accelerated. The Korea
government even further abolished financial account controls. The financial and currency crisis
eventually burst in 1997–1998.
With regard to Market Capitalization, it had played a positive role in Taiwan and Korea.
However, the estimated coefficient of Turnover is insignificantly or even negative in Taiwan and
Korea cases. This result is inconsistent with the findings of Levine and Zervos (1998). They
found that the liquidity of the stock market was a robust predictor of economic growth. Moreover,
all coefficients of Stock Return were significantly positive except that in Korea. It seems that the
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19 Stock market capitalization ratio and turnover ratio are not available for Japan’s quarterly data.
20 In Appendix B, we compare the difference between principal components estimates and original lease square
estimates.
stock market development had contributed to Taiwan’s economic growth comparing with those
in Korea and Japan.
The coefficients on Crisis Dummy are not only statistically significant but negative in Korea
and Japan. This result implied that Taiwan’s economy did not worsen significantly over the Asian
financial crisis period. Finally, the interaction between capital outflow to GDP ratio and Dummy
has a statistically significant negative correlation with economic growth in Taiwan and Korea,
although the effect is positive but insignificant in Japan. However, the coefficient estimate for the
interaction of capital inflow to GDP ratio with Dummy is insignificantly positive or even negative
in all three economies. These results reveal that capital outflows had negative effects on Taiwan
and Korea economic growth, while the capital inflows might hurt Taiwanese and Japan’s
economic growth when the foreign exchange deregulation.
5. Conclusions
In the past two decades, Taiwan and Korea had experienced rapid economic growth, while
Japan did not. This paper tries to investigate the sources of economic growth in these economies.
Particularly, we focus on the role of financial development and structure (including banking and
stock markets), monetary and financial policies, as well as the degree of international capital
mobility in the economic growth processes.
The major findings could be summarized as follows. (1) High investment had accelerated
economic growth in Japan, while high investment to GDP ratio did not necessarily lead to better
growth performance if investment did not have been allocated efficiently or if overinvestment
exist, e.g. in Taiwan and Korea cases. (2) Real export growth rate had contributed to Taiwan and
Korea. (3) The finance-aggregate had positive effects on the economy of Taiwan, but had
negative effect on Korea and Japan. One possible reason may be due to the relatively sound
financial system and prudentially financial regulation and supervision in Taiwan comparing with
those in Korea and Japan. (4) The stock market development had positive effects on economic
growth in Taiwan. (5) Taiwanese economy suffered less from the Asian financial crisis. (6) After
foreign exchange deregulation, capital outflows had negative effects on all three economies,
while the effect of capital inflows is negative but insignificant.
In this paper, we had combined the principal component analysis with time series analysis to
investigate the relation of financial growth and structure with economic growth. In order to do so,
we categorize the banking and financial indicators into financial aggregate, instead of putting all
financial variables separately in the regression model. However, there still somework to be done.
In the future study, it is fruitful to test the model by using the cross-country panel data. Also, it
may extend the study by including more country data as long as the data are available.
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Appendix A. Data sources
The data included in this study have contained consist of real GDP, real fixed-capital
investment, employment, real government consumption, real export of goods and services,
consumer price index (CPI), money, quasi-money, bank claims on the private sector by deposit
money banks, deposit money bank domestic assets, central bank domestic assets, the total value
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of listed shares, the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges, the stock price index,
direct investment abroad, direct investment in domestic, portfolio investment assets, and
portfolio investment liabilities. First, about the data for real GDP, real fixed-capital investment,
employment, real government consumption, real export of goods and services, Taiwan data are
from Quarterly National Economic Trends Taiwan Area, the Republic of China, Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. The Korea data are from
Web site http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng. The Japan data are from IMF International Financial
Statistics. Second, about employment, Taiwan data are from Monthly Bulletin of Manpower
Statistics Taiwan Area, Republic of China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. The data of Korea and Japan are, respectively, from Web site
http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng and IMF International Financial Statistics.
The data for money, quasi-money, bank claims on the private sector by deposit money
banks, the deposit money bank domestic assets, central bank domestic assets, direct
investment abroad, direct investment in domestic, portfolio investment assets, and portfolio
investment liabilities of Korea and Japan are all from IMF International Financial Statistics,
while those of Taiwan are from Financial Statistics, Taiwan District Republic of China
(compiled in accordance with IFS format), Central Bank of China. The CPI data of Korea and
Japan are from IMF International Financial Statistics, while that of Taiwan is from
Commodity-Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. The data for total value
of listed shares, the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges, the stock price index
of Taiwan and Korea are from TEJ Data Bank, Taiwan Economic Journal Co. Ltd., and Web
site http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng, respectively. The data of the stock price index of Japan is from
IMF International Financial Statistics.
Appendix B. Principal components
Since the three variables for financial intermediary development indicator are highly
correlated, we use principal components regression to solve this multicollinearity problem. We
select one principal component to capture the main elements of three variables and name it
‘‘finance-aggregate’’. The new estimated coefficient of finance-aggregate is a simple function of
original least squares estimators of these three variables. Though the principal components
estimator is a biased estimator, it may be more precise than its least squares counterpart.
B.1. Principal components regression analysis
Let the model under consideration be
y ¼ Xbþ e;
where y is (T  1),X is (T  K) and non-stochastic, b is (K  1), and e is (T  1) and distributed
as N(0, s2I). Consider the transformation:
y ¼ XPP0bþ e ¼ XPuþ e ¼ Zuþ e; (B.1)
where P is a (K  K) matrix whose columns (pi) are orthogonal characteristic vectors of X0X
ordered to be correspond to the relative magnitudes of the characteristic roots of the positive
definite matrixX
0
X and Z is the (T  T) matrix of principal components. Accordingly, zi = Xpi is
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called the ith principal component, where z0izi ¼ li and li is the ith largest characteristic root of
X
0
X.
The principal components estimator of b is obtained by deleting one or more of the variables
zi, applying ordinary least square to the resulting model and making a transformation back to the
original parameter space. Assume for the moment that Z has been partitioned into two parts Z1,
the zi to be retained, and Z2, the zi to be deleted. This partitioning imposes an identical
partitioning on P. Thus (B.1) becomes
y ¼ XP1u1 þ XP2u2 þ e ¼ Z1u1 þ Z2u2 þ e;
where X{P1:P2} = {Z1:Z2}. The principal components estimator is obtained by an inverse linear
transformation. Since b = Pu = P1u1 + P2u2, omitting the components in Z2 means that u2 has
implicitly been set equal to zero. Hence P2u2 = 0 and the principal components estimator of b is
bˆ ¼ P1uˆ1 ¼ Puˆ;
where uˆ1 ¼ ðZ01Z1Þ1Z01y and uˆ
 ¼ ðuˆ01; 00Þ0 with 0 a null vector of conformable dimension.
B.2. Comparison of the results
The following table shows the difference between least square estimators and principal
components ones. In Taiwan case, the principal components estimate is positive and this shows
that the effect of Commercial–Central Bank dominates Private Credit and M2GDP. In Korea
case, the principal components estimate is also positive but insignificant, so the effect of
Commercial–Central Bank dominates that of Private Credit and M2GDP. In Japan case, the
principal components estimate is significantly negative, but the effect of M2GDP and
Commercial–Central Bank dominates Private Credit. These results indicate that these indicators
of financial development have different effect in different country.
References
Arestis, P., Demetriades, P. O., & Luintel, K. B. (2001). Financial development and economic growth: the role of stock
markets. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33, 16–41.
Bank of Korea. (2002). Financial system in Korea. Bank of Korea.
W.-C Liu, C.-M Hsu / Journal of Asian Economics 17 (2006) 667–690688
Variable Country
Taiwan Korea Japan
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
M2GDP 3.7088 (2.3060) 0.9852 (2.5516) 0.4131 (1.7113) 1.2237 (1.0712) 18.5844** (3.4166) 24.0707** (3.1986)
Commercial–
Central
Bank
29.5640** (5.3181) 19.3131** (6.0658) 33.2187** (6.9038) 22.8464** (4.0316) 67.5537** (14.1235) 67.0784** (12.5787)
Private
Credit
0.0718 (1.5906) 1.0157 (1.6561) 15.3537** (1.2360) 9.1268** (1.4573) 33.4183** (3.8891) 35.8399** (3.1618)
Finance-
aggregate
0.3084** (0.1407) 0.3605** (0.1034) 0.3977 (0.2537) 0.2691 (0.1693) 1.3168** (0.1605) 1.1696** (0.1975)
Note. See Table 8.
Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 408–
443.
Beck, T., Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., Levine, R., &Maksimovic, V. (2001). Financial structure and economic development: Firm,
industry and country evidence. In A. Demirgu¨c-Kunt, & R. Levine (Eds.),Financial structure and economic growth: A
cross-country comparison of banks, markets, and development (pp. 189–241). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 261–
300.
Bencivenga, V. R., & Smith, B. D. (1991). Financial intermediation and endogenous growth. Review of Economic Studies,
58, 195–209.
Bencivenga, V. R., Smith, B. D., & Starr, R. M. (1995). Transactions costs, technological choice, and endogenous growth.
Journal of Economic Theory, 67, 153–177.
Chopra, A., Kang, K., Karasulu, M., Liang, H., Ma, H., Richards, A. J. (2001). From crisis to recovery in Korea: Strategy,
achievements, and lessons, IMF Working Paper No. 01/154.
Demetriades, P. O., & Hussein, K. A. (1996). Does financial development cause economic growth? Time-series evidence
from 16 countries. Journal of Development Economics, 51, 387–411.
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996a). Stock market, corporate finance and economic growth: An overview. The
World Bank Economic Review, 10, 229–239.
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996b). Stock market development and financial intermediaries: Stylized facts. The
World Bank Economic Review, 10, 291–321.
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996c). The financial system and public enterprise reform: Concepts and cases. In N.
Hermes, & R. Lensink (Eds.), Financial development and economic growth: Theory and experiences from developing
countries (pp. 247–286). London: Routledge.
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bank-based and market-based financial systems: Cross-country
comparisons. In Financial structure and economic growth: A cross-country comparison of banks, markets, and
development (pp. 81–140). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fischer, S. (1991). Growth, macroeconomics, and development, NBER macroeconomics annual. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press. pp. 329–364.
Fischer, S. (1993). The role of macroeconomic factors in growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 485–511.
Fuller, W. A. (1976). Introduction to statistical time series. New York, NY: John Wiley.
Gibson, H. D., & Tsakalotos, E. (1994). The scope and limits of financial liberalisation in developing countries: A critical
survey. Journal of Development Studies, 30, 578–628.
Goldsmith, R. W. (1969). Financial structure and development. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Greenwood, J., & Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial development, growth and the distribution of income. Journal of
Political Economy, 98, 1076–1107.
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econometrica, 50, 1029–
1054.
Hanson, J. A. (1994). An open capital account: A brief survey of the issues and the results. In G., Caprio, Jr., I. Atiyas, & J.
A. Hanson (Eds.), Financial reform: Theory and experience. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
He, D. (2004). The role of KAMCO in resolving nonperforming loans in the Republic of Korea, IMFWorking Paper, WP/
04/172.
Honda, E. (2003). Financial deregulation in Japan. Japan and the World Economy, 15, 135–140.
Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. (1999). The Japanese banking crisis: Where did it come from and how will it end? In B. S.
Bernanke, & J. J. Rotemberg (Eds.), NBER macroeconomics annual (pp. 129–201). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hsu, C. M., & Lin, S. M. (2000). Financial development and endogenous growth model. Industry of Free China, 9, 21–47
(in Chinese).
Ji, D., & Park, J. (1999). The Korean banking sector: Current issues and future direction, in rising to the challenge in asia:
A study of financial markets. Asian Development Bank. pp. 27–54.
Johansen, S., & Juselius, K. (1992). Testing structural hypotheses in a multivariate cointegration analysis of PPP and the
UIP for UK. Journal of Econometrics, 53, 211–244.
Johnston, B. R., Darbar, S. M., & Echeverria, C. (1997). Sequencing capital account liberalization: Lessons from the
experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, IMF Working Paper, WP/97/157.
Jolliffe, I. T. (1986). Principal component analysis. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Kim, D. C., & Suh, D. (1998). Financial liberalization and Korean corporations’ financing policy for globalization.
Journal of Asian Economics, 9, 31–66.
Kim, H. E. (2003). Institutional development in the Korea financial sector accompanying globalization and its economic
effects. Korea Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, The Bank of Korea.
W.-C Liu, C.-M Hsu / Journal of Asian Economics 17 (2006) 667–690 689
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993a). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108,
717–737.
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993b). Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth: Theory and evidence. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 32, 513–542.
Leahy, M., Schich, S.,Wehinger, G., & Pelgrin F. (2001). Contributions of financial systems to growth in OECD countries,
OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 280.
Lee, J. W., Lee, H. H., & Yang, D. Y. (2001). Structural reform in Korea: Its process and consequences. In T. V. Hoa (Ed.),
The Asia recovery: Issues and aspects of development, growth, trade and investment (pp. 15–33). Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar.
Levine, R. (1991). Stock markets, growth, and tax policy. The Journal of Finance, 46, 1445–1465.
Levine, R. (1997). Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. Journal of Economic Literature, 35,
688–726.
Levine, R., Loayza, N., & Beck, T. (2000). Financial intermediation and growth causality and causes. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 46, 31–77.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 88, 537–558.
Lin, K. S., Lee, H. Y., & Huang, B. Y. (1996). The role of macroeconomic policy in export-led growth: The experience of
Taiwan and South Korea. In T. Ito, & A. O. Krueger (Eds.), Financial deregulation and integration in East Asia (pp.
193–224). The University of Chicago Press.
McKinnon, R. I. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
McKinnon, R. I. (1991). The order of economic liberalization financial control in the transition to a market economy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ministry of Finance. (1996). The ROC financial system and policy. Ministry of Finance.
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
covariance matrix. Econometrica, 55, 703–708.
Odedokun, M. O. (1996). Alternative econometric approaches for analysing the role of the financial sector in economic
growth: Time-series evidence from LDCs. Journal of Development Economics, 50, 119–146.
Saint-Paul, G. (1992). Technological choice, financial markets and economic development. European Economic Review,
36, 763–781.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1911). The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shaw, E. S. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, H. (2000). The state, banking and corporate relationships in Korea and Taiwan. In P. Drysdale (Ed.), Reform and
recovery in East Asia—The role of the state and economic enterprise (pp. 59–98). London: Routledge.
Takahashi, W., & Kobayakawa, S. (2003). Globalization: Role of institution building in the Japanese financial sector,
Bank of Japan Working Paper Series No. 03-E-7.
Taniuchi, M. (1997). Recent development in Japan’s financial sector: Bad loans and financial deregulations. Journal of
Asian Economics, 8, 225–244.
Tsuruta, H. (1999). The bubble economy and financial crisis in Japan. International Journal of Political Economy, 29,
26–48.
World Bank. (1993). The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
W.-C Liu, C.-M Hsu / Journal of Asian Economics 17 (2006) 667–690690
